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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1224 OF 6 AUGUST 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIA, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ALL OTHER ME POSTS.MY TELS NOS 1222 AND 1223 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. IT WAS CLEAR WHEN THE COUNCIL GATHERED THIS MORNING (6 AUGUST) THAT THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD DESIRE TO AVOID A VETO ON THE SOVIET DRAFT AND A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ANY US COUNTER-PROPOSAL. NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) TOLD ME THAT HE WAS READY TO COOPERATE. SO WERE SPAIN AND THE NON-ALIGNED. BUT LICHENSTEIN (US) WOULD MAKE NO MOVE. OVINNIKOV (USSR) WAS ONLY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE AMERICANS. MY EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE THEREFORE GOT NOWHERE. THE AMERICANS HAD APPARENTLY MADE UP THEIR MIND TO VETO. THE TEXT WAS PUT TO THE VOTE WITH ONE SMALL AMENDMENT TO ACCOMMODATE THE FRENCH. THE PHRASE "AS A FIRST STEP" WAS DELETED IN PARAGRAPH 3 AND "UNTIL THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY" ADDED AT THE END.
2. BEFORE THE VOTE TUENI (LEBANON) EMPHASISED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD PRESERVE UNANIMITY AND A MEASURE OF CONSENSUS IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL. TERZI (PLO) AND OVINNIKOV (USSR) MADE BRIEF STATEMENTS, AND LOUET (FRANCE), LING QING (CHINA) AND I MADE EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE (TEXT OF MINE IN MIFT). LOUET SAID THAT THE MEASURES PROPOSED WERE SOUND. LING QING SAID THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRONGER.
3. THE VOTE WAS 11-1 (US) -3 (UK, TOGO, ZAIRE). THEREAFTER NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) SAID THAT THE PUNITIVE MEASURES SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO MORE THAN A FIRST STEP TO BE FOLLOWED BY MUCH STERNER MEASURES. LICHENSTEIN (US) SAID THE US HAD WORKED HARD TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS. IT WOULD DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT AFFECT HABIB'S MISSION ADVERSELY. IT REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR SCR 516 AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE OBSERVERS, WHILE EMPHASISING THAT THE MODALITIES OF SUCH DEPLOYMENT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE RESOLUTION WAS UNBALANCED AND WOULD NOT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE. HE REGRETTED SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO POLARISE THE COUNCIL. OVINNIKOV CHARGED THE US WITH NOT TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A TEXT.
4. BLUM (ISRAEL) THIS TIME DIRECTED HIS VENOM AT LOUET, SAYING THAT THE FRENCH VOTE REPRESENTED "A DAY OF SHAME AND INFAMY FOR FRANCE". HE QUOTED EXAMPLES FROM THE ALGERIAN WAR AND ACCUSED THE FRENCH OF HYPOCRISY. LOUET RESPONDED DEFTLY WITH PAINED ASTONISHMENT AT BLUM'S INTEMPERATE BEHAVIOUR; AND BY CITING A LA FONTAINE FABLE OF THE HELPFUL BEAR WHO KILLED THE GARDENER WITH A STONE AIMED TO KEEP THE FLIES FROM BUZZING ROUND HIS HEAD. AFTER

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/ STATEMENTS

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STATEMENTS BY DORR (IRELAND), TERZI (PLO) AND MAKSOUD (ARAB LEAGUE), MOUSSA (EGYPT) SUGGESTED THAT THE AFTERNOON'S PROCEEDINGS HAD NOT BEEN THE FINEST HOUR FOR ANYBODY CONCERNED: BEIRUT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BENEFIT. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF LOOKING ONCE AGAIN AT THE FRANCO/EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION. AT THE END TUENI INTERVENED AGAIN TO INVITE THE UK TO USE ITS SKILL TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT AT A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH MIGHT "RESTORE UNITY AND SANITY". (I TOOK THIS UP WITH HIM AND OTHERS AFTERWARDS: SEE MY SECOND IFT).

5. COMMENT. THIS WAS A BAD DEBATE AND A BAD OUTCOME WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED WITH MINIMUM OF DEXTERITY ON THE PART OF THE US. FOLLOWING THE US VOTE IN FAVOUR OF SCR 516 AND ABSTENTION ON SCR 517, THE SOVIET UNION WAS DETERMINED TO USE THE ISRAELI REJECTION AS A PEG ON WHICH TO HANG A US VETO. EVERYONE WAS ALIVE TO THIS AND I BELIEVE EVERY OTHER MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, EXCEPT THE DUTIFUL POLE, WANTED TO AVOID IT. GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST SIGN FROM THE US THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO PLAY BALL, THEY COULD HAVE REGAINED THE INITIATIVE, SHUNTED THE SOVIET DRAFT TO ONE SIDE AND FINISHED UP WITH VERBIAGE THAT WOULD HAVE HAD LITTLE PRACTICAL IMPACT BUT ON WHICH CONSENSUS COULD HAVE BEEN REACHED. INSTEAD MRS KIRKPATRICK DID NOT APPEAR, OVINNIKOV GOT WHAT HE WANTED, THE MODEST IMPACT OF SCRS 516 AND 517 WAS WHITTLED AWAY AND THE US WAS AGAIN LINED UP SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE ISRAELIS.

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