

116

PS
PS/MR HOD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
~~SECRETARY~~ W EGERTON
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
~~HD/SEC DEPT~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

HD/...
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
...
...

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 262315Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1730 OF 26 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT,
INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA, PARIS

WASHINGTON TELNO 3420: LEBANON

1. I INVITED BRIAN URQUHART TO LUNCH WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE TODAY (26 OCTOBER).
2. URQUHART SAID, ON THE BASIS OF A CONVERSATION WITH DRAPER ON 17 OCTOBER, THAT HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WERE AIMING FOR A SETTLEMENT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS, WHICH DRAPER BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT:
 - (A) ALL PALESTINIAN, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON: DRAPER HAD SAID THAT ONLY THE TIMING OF THESE WITHDRAWALS REMAINED TO BE NEGOTIATED BUT HAD HAD NO ANSWER WHEN URQUHART ASKED WHERE THE PALESTINIANS WERE TO GO OR HOW THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENT ON SO COMPLEX A PROBLEM.
 - (B) THE "SECURITY ZONE" BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER AND THE LITANI WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY.
 - (C) THE HADDAD MILITIA WOULD BE MERGED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY, WITH HADDAD HIMSELF BEING COURT-MARTIALLED AND/OR SENT OVERSEAS AS A MILITARY ATTACHE. THE ISRAELIS HAD AT FIRST INSISTED THAT THE

A MILITARY ATTACHE. THE ISRAELIS HAD AT FIRST INSISTED THAT THE SECURITY ZONE SHOULD BE ENTRUSTED TO HADDAD BUT HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT THE DEGREE OF AMIN GEMAYEL'S ANTI-PATHY FOR HADDAD AND NOW, DRAPER THOUGHT, RECOGNISED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO GIVE WAY.

(D) UNIFIL WOULD BE BASED ON SIDON AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR A SECTOR RUNNING EAST FROM THE COAST ACROSS THE BEKAA AND UP TO THE SYRIAN FRONTIER, ACTING AS A CORDON SANITAIRE TO PREVENT INFILTRATION OF PALESTINIAN OR OTHER ARMED ELEMENTS INTO THE SECURITY ZONE TO THE SOUTH CONTROLLED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY.

3. MR HURD EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE PRACTICABILITY OF ALL THIS. URQUHART AGREED. IT WAS POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF MUTUAL SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BUT THE ISRAELIS WOULD INSIST THAT THE PALESTINIANS TOO LEAVE NORTH LEBANON. MANY OF THOSE WHO HAD LEFT BEIRUT HAD ALREADY RETURNED AND THE PLO HAD A SUBSTANTIAL ARMED PRESENCE IN THE NORTH. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE REMOVED EITHER BY ARMED FORCE (AND WHO WAS GOING TO PROVIDE THAT?) OR BY PERSUASION. THE ONLY INCENTIVE WHICH MIGHT PERSUADE THEM TO GO WOULD BE SOME POLITICAL CONCESSION BY THE AMERICANS, EG AGREEMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PLO DIRECT, BUT IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD MAKE THIS CONCESSION OTHER THAN IN THE CONTEXT OF PALESTINE. THERE WAS ALSO THE VERY DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WHERE THE PALESTINIANS WOULD GO.

4. URQUHART DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNIFIL PLAYING THE ROLE DESCRIBED AT 2(D) ABOVE. BUT HE DID NOT LIKE IT. AS BEFORE, HE STATED A PREFERENCE FOR UNIFIL BEING USED AS UNEF II WAS IN IMPLEMENTING THE DISENGAGEMENT IN SINAI NEGOTIATED BY KISSINGER IN 1973/4. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE UNIFIL TO BE USED TO PROTECT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH BUT THERE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO BE A LEBANESE REQUEST FOR THIS. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE TWO YEARS BEFORE THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSUME CONTROL OF THE SECURITY ZONE.

5. URQUHART WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE ASSUMING NEW RESPONSIBILITIES OUTSIDE ITS PRESENT AREA OF DEPLOYMENT. IT SUFFERED FROM THE BASIC WEAKNESS OF NOT HAVING A SINGLE COMMANDER. INsofar AS THERE WAS ANY COORDINATED DIRECTION, IT CAME FROM THE THREE AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT. THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COPE IF THE FORCE BECAME INVOLVED IN SHOOTING INCIDENTS.

6. URQUHART SAID THAT UNIFIL AND THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WERE IN REASONABLY GOOD HEART. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT THE FINNS HAD VOLUNTEERED TO REPLACE THE NEPALESE BATTALION.

7. BUT IN GENERAL URQUHART WAS HIS USUAL PESSIMISTIC (BUT PROBABLY REALISTIC) SELF ABOUT BOTH THE LEBANON AND THE WIDER PALESTINE PROBLEM. HE FEELS THAT LIKUD-STYLE GOVERNMENTS ARE HERE TO STAY IN ISRAEL AND THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THEIR MAKING CONCESSIONS ON THE WEST BANK OR GAZA UNLESS PLACED UNDER VERY SEVERE PRESSURE

ISRAEL AND THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THEIR MAKING CONCESSIONS
ON THE WEST BANK OR GAZA UNLESS PLACED UNDER VERY SEVERE PRESSURE
BY THE AMERICANS WHICH MAY NOT BE FORTHCOMING: THAT THE REAGAN PLAN
IS BEGINNING TO RUN OUT OF STEAM: THAT IT WILL ONLY WORK IF HUSSEIN
IS PROVIDED WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF ARAB SUPPORT: AND THAT IT
IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE AMERICANS KNOW HOW TO MOBILISE THIS OR,
IF THEY DID, COULD MANAGE TO DELIVER IT ON THEIR OWN.

THOMSON

NNNN