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DESKBY 271400Z NOV 82 F

DESKBY MIDDLE EAST POSTS 271500Z NOV 82

DESKBY PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON FIRST CONTACT FROM AMMAN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 533 OF 27 NOV 82
TO INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 851 TO RABAT: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION:

PLO REPRESENTATION.



- 1. MOST UNFORTUNATELY (OWING TO PROBLEMS WITH OUR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT) YOUR TELSNOS 851-853 TO RABAT WERE NOT AVAILABLE HERE UNTIL VERY LATE LAST NIGHT. I WAS NOT , THEREFORE , ABLE TO SEE THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN UNTIL THIS MORNING.
- 2. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. TO WHOM I GAVE THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE AND PROPOSED STATEMENT. TOGETHER WITH A SPEAKING NOTE SUMMARISING SOME OF THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 851 (OTHERS I MADE ORALLY) , SAID THAT HE THOUGHT YOUR SUGGESTED STATEMENT A FAIR ONE AND EXPRESSED HIS REGRET THAT KING HASSAN HAD DECIDED TO CANCEL THE VISIT BY THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON (RABAT TELNO 467). QASEM SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED BY THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY FAHOUM IN DAMASCUS ON 26 NOVEMBER AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PALESTINE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING REJECTING THE REAGAN INITIATIVE (DAMASCUS TELNO 333), WHICH HE REGARDED AS A CLEAR SIGN THAT THE PLO HAD PUT THE INTERESTS OF THEIR ORGANISATION BEFORE THOSE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THAT IN DOING SO THEY HAD SUCCUMBED TO SYRIAN INFLUENCE. QASEM SAID THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY NOTIFICATION FROM THE MOROCCANS THAT THE VISIT TO LONDON BY THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION HAD BEEN CANCELLED: INDEED THE LAST MESSAGE THEY HAD HAD FROM THEIR MISSION IN RABAT YESTERDAY MORNING HAD INDICATED THAT THE VISIT WAS STILL GOING AHEAD.
- 3. I THEN SAW MR HABIB, WHO WAS DUE TO HAVE TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN LATER IN THE MORNING, AND BRIEFED HIM ON WHAT HAD OCCURRED. HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED AN ACCOUNT OF SIR OLIVER WRIGHT'S MEETING WITH VELIOTES (WASHINGTON TELNO 3836 RECEIVED HERE AFTER MY MEETING WITH HABIB) BUT HAD NOT YET SEEN THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT IN YOUR TELNO 852 TO RABAT: IN SPEAKING TO HABIB I PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS
 ON THE POINT IN PARA 2.V. OF THE INSTRUCTIONS TO WASHINGTON IN YOUR TELNO 2088. HABIB EMPHASISED THAT AS VELIOTES HAD

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ALREADY

ALREADY TOLD HM AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON, EVEN ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE PLO WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF TO OPEN THE WAY TO A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE US ADMINISTRA—TION AND THE PLO, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE A USEFUL FORWARD STEP. US DESIDERATA HAD BEEN CLEARLY EXPLAINED TO KING HASSAN, WHO FULLY UNDERSTOOD THEM. HABIB SAID HE WOULD NOT HIMSELF RAISE WITH THE JORDANIANS THE QUESTION OF THE VISIT BY THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON, WHICH HE SAW AS PRIMARILY A BRITISH AFFAIR, BUT THAT IF THE JORDANIANS BROUGHT IT UP HE WOULD CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO SAY THAT PLO AGREEMENT TO A STATEMENT OF THE KIND WE HAD SUGGESTED WOULD REPRESENT A USEFUL ADVANCE.

4. I SAW KING HUSSEIN AT MID -DAY, BEFORE HE STARTED HIS TALKS WITH HABIB, AND LEFT WITH HIM THE SAME PAPERS I HAD ALREADY LEFT WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER (SEE PARA 2. ABOVE).KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY MESSAGE FROM KING HASSAN.

THE KING SAID HE HAD KNOWN THE SITUATION WAS ALREADY CRITICAL AT THE TIME HE HAD SENT HIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER SEMICOLON HE FOUND IT HARD TO TELL WHETHER IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE TO RETRIEVE IT. I TOLD HIM OF YOUR HOPE THAT HE WOULD SPEAK DIRECTLY TO KING FAHD AND KING HASSAN SEMICOLON I ALSO EXPLAINED WHY I HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO THIS EFFECT LAST NIGHT. THE KING SAID HE WOULD LET ME KNOW OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS, BUT HE WAS CLEARLY NOT OPTIMISTIC.

5. THE FACT THAT KING HASSAN HAD APPARENTLY OBTAINED KING FAHD'S PRIOR AGREEMENT TO THE CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT AND ALSO THE STRONG REACTION OF THE PLO (DAMASCUS TELNO 332) SUGGEST THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS AN ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TASK SEMICOLON INDEED HE MAY NOW PREFER TO KEEP HIS POWDER DRY FOR SOME OTHER OCCASION. ARAFAT IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN AMMAN THIS EVENING AND THE KING WILL BE HAVING TALKS WITH HIM TOMORROW.

URWICK

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