MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 14 15   pa

PS LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON.
SIR J BULLARD. MR CARTLEDGE   NO 10 DOWNING STREET
HD/NENAD   CABINET OFFICE D10
HD/MED
HD/UND

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GRS 650
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DAMASCUS 271100Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 278 OF 27 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK, ROME, PARIS, BEIRUT,
JEDDA.

MY TELNO 277 AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 884

LEBANON:

1. I CALLED ON HEAD OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF MFA ON
27 SEPTEMBER TO DEAL WITH A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES AND TOOK
THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN A RUN DOWN OF SYRIAN VIEWS OF THE
CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

2. HADDAD EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED
BUT SOME PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE. HE REGARDED FADI FREMS
STATEMENT THAT THE LEBANESE FORCES RETAINED THE RIGHT NOT TO
ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONGRESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AS
OMINOUS. HE WAS CONCERNED IN ANY CASE THAT THE BASIC CONDITION
FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON, AN ANNULMENT OF THE
ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT (FREEZING IT WAS DEFINATELY NOT

ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT (FREEZING IT WAS DEFINATELY NOT
ENOUGH) WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE AMERICANS, AND HENCE BY
THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT EVEN THOUGH THEY KNEW IT WAS INAPPLICABLE.

3.   HADDAD SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD HAD SECRET MEETINGS WITH
THE NSF LEADERSHIP AT WHICH THEY HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE SYRIANS
WERE FED UP WITH LEBANON AND DID NOT WISH TO SPEND ANOTHER LIFE
OR ANOTHER PIASTRE THERE. THE NSF WERE ENTIRELY FREE TO MAKE
WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS THEY LIKED WITH THE OTHER PARTIES IN LEBANON
PROVIDED ONLY THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THERE SHOULD
BE ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA. THEY COULD GO ON
CUTTING EACH OTHERS THROATS IF THEY WANTED TO. HE INSISTED THAT
SYRIAN POLICY WAS THAT ALL NON LEBANESE FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW
TOTALLY FROM LEBANON. ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD LEAVE AT ONCE AND
UNCONDITIONALLY HE COULD GIVE THE MOST SOLEMN GUARANTEE THAT
IF THIS TOOK PLACE THE SYRIANS WOULD THEN LEAVE. BUT ISRAELI
DEPARTURE MUST OF COURSE INCLUDE THE GIVING UP OF THE CRYPTO-
ISRAELI SAAD HADDAD ENCLAVE. THE MNF SHOULD ALSO LEAVE. THE SYRIANS
WERE CONVINCED THAT THE U S CONTINGENT HAD ASSISTED THE LAF TO
BREAK INTO WEST BEIRUT AND THEY AND THE FRENCH HAD FALLEN FOR
PHALANGE BOMBARDMENT OF THEIR POSITIONS AND GOT INVOLVED IN
FACTIONAL FIGHTING.

4. ON MORE PRECISE POINTS HE POINTED OUT THAT
A) THE OBSERVERS WOULD COME FROM NEUTRAL COUNTRIES WHICH MEANT
THAT CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF WERE RULED OUT. SOME WOULD BE FROM
UNTSO AND UNIFIL AND OTHERS MIGHT BE FOR INSTANCE FROM INDIA. IN
HIS VIEW BY FAR THE BEST FRAMEWORK WOULD BE A UNITED NATIONS ONE
AND HE THOUGHT THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE MIGHT BE SOUGHT.
B) THE CEASEFIRE INVOLVED MAINTAINANCE OF ALL FORCES WHERE THEY
WERE, INCLUDING LEBANESE FORCES ELEMENTS STILL IN THE SHOUF.
C) THE VENUE FOR THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE WAS
UNDECIDED. A SITE IN BEIRUT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR NSF. THE
PRESSURES WOULD BE TOO GREAT. THEY HAD SUGGESTED TUNIS. THE
PRESENT FAVOURITE WAS SAUDI ARABIA WHICH SEEMED TO THE SYRIANS
A GOOD IDEA. THEY HAVE HOWEVER NO DESIDERATA THEMSELVES ON THIS
SUBJECT AND WERE QUITE RELAXED.
D) THE AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE WAS EQUALLY OBSCURE. THE ONLY
CLEAR POINT WAS THAT THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT ANNULMENT MUST BE
THE FIRST ITEM. ONCE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN MADE IT SHOULD NOT
BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH A WIDER AGREEMENT ON OTHER POINTS GIVEN
TIME AND GOOD WILL.

4. MARWAN HAMADE TOLD THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN THE LAST 24 HRS THAT
IT WOULD QUITE CLEARLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO UNSCRAMBLE THE WHOLE
PROBLEM OF LEBANON QUICKLY AND AT ONCE. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO

PROBLEM OF LEBANON QUICKLY AND AT ONCE. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO
PROCEED ISSUE BY ISSUE AND THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE
LENGHTY.

5. COMMENT. HADDAD ALTERNATED BETWEEN SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND
SPEAKING WITH SOME AUTHORITY. HE IS NOT RENOWNED FOR BEING IN THE
PICTURE. HIS INFORMATION ON OBSERVERS SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH SOME
RESERVE BUT ON POINTS 3(C) AND (D) HE APPEARED CONFIDENT.

MARSHALL

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