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TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 544 27 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON. ROME BEIRUT

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, DAMASCUS CAIRO TEL AVIV JEDDA AMMAN UKMIS  
GENEVA.

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

LEBANON MEETING OF MNF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN PARIS 27 OCTOBER

1. A TWO HOUR DISCUSSION PRODUCED A USEFUL PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION OF THE COMMITMENT OF THE MNF PARTNERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD USE OUR LEVERAGE TO PRESS ALL THE FACTIONS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS OUTSIDE LEBANON TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS IN GENEVA. COUPLED WITH RECOGNITION THAT ANY HINT OF A THREAT TO PULL OUT OUR FORCES WOULD JEOPARDISE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO COORDINATE AID TO LEBANON AND TO KEEP IN TOUCH DISCREETLY IN GENEVA OVER CONTACTS WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS BUT NO APPETITE FOR JOINT DEMARCHES AND NO WILLINGNESS TO SET UP ANY MORE FORMAL STRUCTURE FOR PLANNING FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON. THERE WAS GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT LEBANON SHOULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE WIDER PEACE PROCESS.

(TEXT FROM PARIS)

MNF SECURITY

2. SHULTZ SAID THAT ALL THE MNF CONTINGENTS WOULD NEED TO IMPROVE THEIR PHYSICAL SECURITY AT THE COST OF SOME OF THE NORMALITY THEY WERE TRYING TO PROMOTE. THERE WAS AGREEMENT WITH HIS SUGGESTION THAT CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD EXCHANGE AS MUCH INTELLIGENCE AS POSSIBLE AND COORDINATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BUT SHULTZ STRESSED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE SECURITY WAS TO

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KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF POLITICAL STABILITY WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN FORCES. HE WAS EMPHATIC THAT IN THE MEANTIME FOR THE MNF TO CAVE IN UNDER TERRORIST ATTACK WOULD DO GREAT HARM TO LEBANON THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE INTERESTS OF THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS.

GENEVA TALKS ON RECONCILIATION.

3. BOTH ANDREOTTI AND I EMPHASISED THAT FAILURE AT GENEVA WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO JUSTIFY THE RETENTION OF OUR TROOPS IN LEBANON. I URGED THAT WE SHOULD USE THIS CARD TO PUT PRESSURE ON GEMAYEL TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. ONCE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS WAS UNDER WAY IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE A FRAMEWORK FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IN STAGES WHICH WOULD IN TURN PAVE THE WAY FOR A UNITED LEBANON. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON ALL THE FACTIONS IN GENEVA CARE HOWEVER WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO STRIKE A BALANCE IN CASE THOSE WHO HAD NO INTEREST IN SUCCESS AT GENEVA CONCLUDED THAT THEY COULD DRIVE THE MNF OUT BY WRECKING THE TALKS.

ISRAEL/SYRIA

4. ALL THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTORS STRONGLY EMPHASISED THE NEED TO SQUARE UP TO THE SYRIAN PROBLEM AND TO MEET SYRIAN CONCERNS. ANDREOTTI SAID THAT OUR AIM SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. WE SHOULD MAINTAIN SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE CONTACTS TO SECURE AT LEAST AN AMBER LIGHT FROM ASAD BEFORE WE COULD HOPE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN LEBANON. SHULTZ TOOK THE LINE THAT THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE ASAD THINK TWICE ABOUT WHAT HE COULD ACHIEVE BY BEING OBSTRUCTIVE IN LEBANON WAS TO BUILD UP A BALANCE OF FORCES. I WITH SUPPORT FROM CHEYSSON SAID THAT WE HAD TO RECOGNISE WHETHER WE LIKED IT OR NOT THAT BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL HAD INTERESTS IN LEBANON HAVING IN MIND MURPHY'S COMMENTS TO MR LUCE ON THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT (WASHINGTON TELNO 3132) I SAID THAT ONE WAY OF RECOGNISING SYRIA'S INTEREST WAS TO WORK FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. IT WAS A FACT THAT THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT WAS NOW FROZEN AND COULD NOT BE USED AS A BARGAINING CHIP.



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INSTEAD WE SHOULD LOOK FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A COMPONENT WHICH WOULD INCREASE ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

5. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE VALUE OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WAS THAT IT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE EXISTING ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WITHDRAWAL WAS UNDER DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL. WITH THE RETURN OF PLO ELEMENTS TO BEIRUT THE MOOD IN ISRAEL WAS CHANGING IF ONE RESULT OF GENEVA WAS THE ABOGATION OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT SHULTZ EXPECTED A HARDENING OF ISRAELI ATTITUDES ON WITHDRAWAL. HE HOPED THEREFORE THAT NO ONE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE TO ABANDON THE AGREEMENT. THE US WHICH WAS BOUND BY THE AGREEMENT COULD NOT RENOUNCE IT AND SILENCE WAS PERHAPS THE BEST COURSE.

6. CHEYSSON SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS BE TOLD PRIVATELY THAT THEIR GAME OF PLAYING OFF THE LEBANESE FACTIONS AGAINST EACH OTHER WAS TOO CLEVER AND HAD GONE TOO FAR. SHULTZ AGREED THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE URGED TO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO A BROADENED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

#### ARAB/ISRAEL

7. ON THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS SHULTZ WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO STRESS HIS INTENTION TO KEEP WORKING AWAY AT THE WEST BANK PROBLEM. THE FACTS ON THE GROUNDS WERE CHANGING RAPIDLY AND HE WANTED TO BRING THEM TO THE ? ARAFAT'S PROBLEMS MEANT AT THE LEAST A RE-SHUFFLE OF THE PACK. HE HOPED THAT THE ARAB SUMMIT WOULD GIVE HUSSEIN GREATER SUPPORT IT S DANGEROUS HOWEVER TO OVER-ESTIMATE THE EXTENT OF SAUDI INFLUENCE OVER THE SYRIANS WHO COULD BE MOVED BY INCENTIVES BUT NOT THREATS. THERE WAS A PARALLEL HERE WITH US RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL THE US NEEDED A SUFFICIENTLY WARM RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL TO BE ABLE TO REASON WITH HER.

#### RETALIATION

8. I RAISED THIS AND URGED CAUTION A GENERAL RETALIATION IN RESPONSE TO ACTIONS BY TERRORISTS WAS VERY RISKY. CHEYSSON SUPPORTED ME, DOUBTING WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PINPOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMB ATTACKS EVEN IF THE SERVICES OF ONE COUNTRY KNEW OF THE OPERATION AND POSSIBLY PARTICIPATED IN IT. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE MAKING



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THE MOST CAREFUL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF THE ATTACKS BUT FAILURE TO RETALIATE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE GROUP WHICH THE AMERICANS THOUGHT TO BE RESPONSIBLE TO THINK THAT THEY COULD GET AWAY WITH FURTHER OUTRAGES. REFERRING TO THE DEMARCHES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS IN DAMASCUS (DAMASCUS TELNO 327) ABOUT WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE APPARENTLY UNAWARE SHULTZ SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NO GROUNDS FOR CONCERN BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO TELL THEM SO.

OBSERVERS.

9. ANDREOTTI REPORTED THAT THERE WAS STILL DISAGREEMENT WITHIN LEBANON ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS. AS A MINIMUM THE ITALIANS REQUIRED THE ENDORSEMENT OF JUMBLATT THE SHIAS AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IF THEY WERE TO TAKE PART CRAXI HAD AGREED WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE MINIMUM UN UMBRELLA WOULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS AND A SYSTEM OF REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ANDREOTTI WAS WORRIED THAT IF THE OBSERVERS WERE BROKEN UP INTO SMALL GROUPS THEY WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS AND SYRIANS WOULD ONLY ACQUIESCE IN GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IF THEY THOUGHT IT COULD BE USED AS A WAY OF LEVERING OUT THE MNF.

AID.

10. SHULTZ EXPRESSED INTEREST IN REMARKS BY CRAXIL IN WASHINGTON ABOUT AID FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEBANON. (ROME TELNO 523). THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE FUNDS. AS I AND CHEYSSON HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT COMMITTING ADDITIONAL MONEY WE AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN TRYING TO CO-ORDINATE OUR EXISTING AID PROGRAMMES TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT. A BIZARRE SUGGESTION BY ANDREOTTI TO RE-BUILD QUNEITRA AS A GESTURE TO THE SYRIANS WAS FIRMLY SQUASHED BY SHULTZ. MNF CO-ORDINATION.

11. MY PROPOSAL THAT OFFICIALS MIGHT GET TOGETHER ON A MORE REGULAR BASIS WAS REACTED TO VERY CAUTIOUSLY BY CHEYSSON IN PARTICULAR. HE SUGGESTED ANOTHER DISCUSSION IN THE MARGINS OF THE DECEMBER NATO COUNCIL MEETING BUT WAS OPPOSED TO ANY FORMAL STRUCTURE FOR CO-

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ORDINATION. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FOUR SHOULD DISCREETLY COMPARE NOTES IN GENEVA BUT THAT CARE WOULD BE TAKEN NOT TO APPEAR TO BE ACTING JOINTLY AS A GROUP CH COUNTRY WOULD CONDUCT ITS OWN CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES. FAIRBANKS WOULD BE IN GENEVA WITH A SMALL STAFF FROM 31 OCTOBER AND A MEETING WOULD BE HELD EARLY NEXT WEEK TO WHICH THE EUROPEANS WOULD SEND REPRESENTATIVES.

HOWE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED	PS/LADY YOUNG
NENAD	PS/MR LUCE
MED	PS/PUS
DEFENCE DEPT	SIR J BULLARD
PUSD	SIR J LEAHY
NEWS DEPT	MR WRIGHT
UND	MR CARTLEDGE
NAD	MR MACINNES
WED	MR ADAMS
SED	MR JAMES
ECD(E)	
FINANCE DEPT	
PROTOCOL DEPT	
PS	

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LEBANON/MNF: SITREP 1000Z 27 OCTOBER

1. Tension in Beirut has continued to be high with Lebanese intelligence reports of plans for attacks similar to those on 23 October. Embassy Beirut was evacuated for a few hours on the morning of 25 October.
2. Latest casualty figures for bomb attacks: Americans: 219 dead, 112 wounded; French: 51 dead, 15 wounded, 50 missing.
3. General Sir Frank Kitson, Commander UK Land Forces, visited Beirut on 25 October. His report is not yet available but does not contain any recommendation for major changes in BRITFORLEB's role.
4. Responsibility for the attacks is still not clear, but an extremist Lebanese Shia group with direct Iranian support in the planning and supply of explosives remains the favourite candidate. Two groups have claimed responsibility: the 'Free Islamic Revolutionary Movement' (unknown previously) and the 'Islamic Holy War Organisation', which also claimed responsibility for the attack on the US Embassy in April 1983. Iran and Syria have denied any involvement.
5. The ceasefire continues to hold with minor violations. BRITFORLEB continues to provide guard for meetings of the ceasefire committee to appreciation of all. Greeks/Italians apparently still intend to deploy 400 observers each to monitor ceasefire. Details under discussion. Italians have told us they do not expect a final decision until after the start of the reconciliation talks in Geneva on 31 October.
6. President Mitterrand (24 October) and Vice President Bush (26 October) have both visited Beirut and have reaffirmed their commitment to the MNF. The Italians have taken a similar line. Americans see main aim of meeting of MNF Foreign Ministers in Paris today (27 October) to demonstrate that the MNF will not be



intimidated into a precipitate withdrawal and to exchange ideas about how to push the reconciliation process along. They have made clear to President Gemayel that urgent progress must be made and that MNF support is not a blank cheque for continuing Maronite supremacy. We plan to put some new ideas to the meeting on working out a strategy for Lebanon aimed at the honourable withdrawal of the MNF at the earliest opportunity. The French Prime Minister, M. Mauroy has suggested a new UN force for Lebanon, eventually to replace the MNF. This does not seem practical at present, given the strong Soviet/Syrian opposition to UN observers, let alone a UN force in central Lebanon, and the probable reluctance of troop contributors.

7. The Syrian MFA presented European MNF Ambassadors with a note on 26 October alleging a US/Israeli plan for military action in Lebanon. We do not take the allegation seriously, though it may reflect genuine Syrian alarm at the possibility of US retaliation.

Near East and North Africa Department  
27 October 1983



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BRITISH GENERAL FLIES TO BEIRUT

THE UK LAND FORCES COMMANDER, GENERAL SIR FRANK KITSON, FLIES INTO BEIRUT THIS MORNING TO REVIEW THE SECURITY OF BRITISH TROOPS IN THE WAKE OF SUNDAY'S SUICIDE BOMB ATTACK.

FOREIGN SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE ANNOUNCING THE TRIP YESTERDAY IN THE COMMONS, ADDED THERE WAS NO PRESENT INTENTION OF CHANGING THE SIZE AND ROLE OF THE 100-MAN BRITISH PRESENCE.

BUT FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON FRENCH AND AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE "IT IS PLAINLY SOMETHING WHICH WILL NOW HAVE TO BE RECONSIDERED BY ALL THOSE CONTRIBUTING TO THE FORCE", HE SAID.

SIR GEOFFREY STRESSED: "WE CONDEMN WITHOUT QUALIFICATION THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS HIDEOUS ATTACK".

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BRITISH COMMANDER FLIES IN TO ALERT

A SENIOR BRITISH GENERAL FLEW INTO A MAJOR SECURITY ALERT TODAY WHEN HE PAID A VISIT TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CONTINGENT IN THE LEBANON PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

GENERAL SIR FRANK KITSON, UK LAND FORCES COMMANDER, HAD TO MAKE ALAST-MINUTE DIVERSION IN HIS HELICOPTER AWAY FROM THE US MARINE BASE AT BEIRUT AIRPORT AS AMERICAN TROOPS RESPONDED TO INFORMATION THAT AN EXPLOSIVES-LADEN LORRY WAS CLOSE.

IT WAS A SIMILARLY-LOADED LORRY THAT DEVASTATED THE MARINES BASE AT THE WEEKEND.

SIR FRANK IS ON A BRIEF VISIT TO BEIRUT AND HAD INTENDED PAYING HIS RESPECTS TO THE US COMMANDER BEFORE GOING ON TO THE BRITISH BASE OUTSIDE THE CITY.

"HOWEVER, THE MARINES WENT TO THEIR HIGHEST ALERT STATE WHEN THE TIP CAME IN AND THE GENERAL HAD TO DIVERT TO THE CARRIER IWO JIMA OFFSHORE TO REFUEL" MAJOR DAVID SPACKMAN OF THE BRITISH PEACEKEEPING UNIT SAID.

HE EVENTUALLY LANDED ABOUT 20 MINUTES LATER WHEN THE ALL-CLEAR WAS GIVEN AND DROVE WITH AN ESCORT OF BRITISH SCOUT CARS TO THEIR BASE AT HADATH.

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