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DD 211430Z WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

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DESKBY 211430Z

FM FCO 211235Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1960 OF 21 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS DESKBY 211430Z NOV 83

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (FOR S OF S PARTY), PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNOS 3491 AND 3500: LEBANON/MNF

1. THANK YOU FOR THESE REPORTS. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THIS PROMPT US RESPONSE. FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON THE FOUR MAIN POINTS RAISED BY THE AMERICANS.

2. TIMING OF TEN STATEMENT. WE NOTE SHULTZ'S CONCERN ABOUT A TEN STATEMENT AT THIS STAGE. BUT WE DO NOT (NOT) BELIEVE THAT THE TEN CAN REFRAIN FROM COMMENT ALTOGETHER ON THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN LEBANON. THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE PRESSURE FOR A STATEMENT AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. OUR IDEAS ON WHAT MIGHT BE SAID ARE DESIGNED TO ADD TO, NOT DILUTE THE PRESSURE ON THOSE ON THE GROUND WHO HAVE TO COMPROMISE.

3. ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. WE VERY MUCH DOUBT WHETHER THE TEN WILL BE ABLE TO AGREE ON A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT. WE WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT AT THE TIME BUT OTHERS IN THE TEN HAVE DELIBERATELY DISTANCED THEMSELVES FROM IT. WE ARE NOT (NOT) PROPOSING TO SUPPORT OR IMPLY SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT'S ABROGATION. BUT NOR CAN THE AMERICANS SERIOUSLY EXPECT THE TEN TO GO BEYOND THE FORMULA AGREED BETWEEN PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND ALL THE LEBANESE PARTIES AT THE GENEVA TALKS WHICH EFFECTIVELY SET THE AGREEMENT ON ONE SIDE. WE REALISE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE PUSHING THE AMERICANS HARD TO INSIST THAT THE FULL AGREEMENT BE RETAINED. (THEY HAVE ASKED US FOR PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION OF OUR SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT: WE HAVE DECLINED). THE FACT IS THAT RECONCILIATION OF ALL THE PARTIES IN LEBANON AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT CANNOT SENSIBLY

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BE PURSUED AS TWO SIMULTANEOUS POLICY OBJECTIVES. NO MORE BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT EMERGING FROM THE RECONCILIATION TALKS (A STATED US OBJECTIVE) IS GOING TO RATIFY THE AGREEMENT, AT LEAST IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO REPUDIATE THE FORMULA AGREED AT GENEVA AND RECOMMIT HIS GOVERNMENT TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WILL ONLY RESULT IN THE SYRIANS EXERTING FURTHER PRESSURE, INCLUDING MILITARY PRESSURE, THROUGH THEIR PROXIES IN LEBANON. THIS WILL MEAN A FURTHER SETBACK FOR THE RECONCILIATION TALKS, QUITE APART FROM HAVING UNPLEASANT CONSEQUENCES FOR THE MNF. ACCORDING TO THE LEBANESE (BEIRUT TELNO 652) THE FUNDAMENTAL SYRIAN OBJECTION IS NOT TO THE AGREEMENT AS SUCH BUT TO THE SIDE LETTER ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. CONCESSIONS ARE NEEDED FROM BOTH SIDES: IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A SOLUTION BY WHICH THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WOULD BE TACITLY PUT ON ONE SIDE (THE SYRIAN BOTTOM LINE) IN EXCHANGE FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT RESTRICTED TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL (PROBABLY THE ISRAELI BOTTOM LINE). FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT MAY BE A WORTHY OBJECTIVE FOR THE FUTURE. IT IS NOT A REALISTIC OBJECTIVE NOW, NOR ARE WE WILLING TO SEE ATTEMPTS TO MAKE IT SO BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO RECONCILIATION AND TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES INCLUDING THE MNF.

4. AS FAR AS THE STATEMENT IS CONCERNED WE ARE PREPARED TO TRY TO GET A FORMULA ALONG THE LINES MENTIONED IN PARA 7 FIRST TUR. AGREED BY OUR PARTNERS. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE YOU SUGGEST IN PARA 14 OF TUR IE. THAT IT IS NOT FOR THE TEN TO TAKE A FORMAL POSITION ON PAST OR FUTURE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES: THE NEED IS TO FOCUS ON THE KEY ISSUES WHICH NEED TO BE ADDRESSED.

5. LEGITIMACY OF GEMAYEL'S GOVERNMENT. WE SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN INCLUDING A REFERENCE ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY PELLETREAU (PARA 10 OF FIRST TUR).

6. WITHDRAWAL OF MNF. WE AGREE WITH SHULTZ (PARA 6 OF SECOND TUR) THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF NEEDS TO BE USED AS A LEVER IN NEGOTIATIONS TO SECURE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE

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SUGGESTED DEPARTURE OF THE MNF WITHIN THE SAME GENERAL TIMEFRAME AS, BUT NO LATER THAN THE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER FOREIGN FORCES, WITH NO PRECISE COMMITMENT ON DATES. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE A BROADLY BASED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WANTING THE MNF TO STAY LONGER THAN THAT. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR, AS YOU TOLD MURPHY, THAT THE MNF WILL NOT STAY IN BEIRUT FOREVER. AS YOU SUGGESTED THIS IS ONE OF THE TOPICS WHICH NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED BY MNF CONTRIBUTORS.

7. PLEASE EXPLAIN THESE POINTS TO MURPHY. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THEIR PROMPT RESPONSE AND WILL DO OUR BEST TO MAKE SURE THAT THEIR CONCERNS ARE ADEQUATELY CATERED FOR IN ANYTHING THE TEN MIGHT AGREE TO SAY. THE AMERICANS WILL REALIZE THAT WE ARE ONLY ONE OF TEN AND THAT SOME OF OUR PARTNERS ARE MUCH FURTHER AWAY FROM THE US POSITION THAN WE ARE. IT WILL BE FOR THE PRESIDENCY TO KEEP THEM BRIEFED ON PROGRESS WITH THE FORMAL STATEMENT. WE SHALL OF COURSE STAY IN TOUCH INFORMALLY.

HOWE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
PUSD
NEWS DEPT
UND
NAD
WED
SED
ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
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